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Abstract: This paper investigates the determinants of government size at the provincial level 
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for endogeneity in the study. Our study shows that openness to trade and foreign direct 
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1 Introduction  
The determinants of government size have been an important research area in the literature of 
economics and political science. After World War II, the size of the public sector expanded in 
most countries (Cooke 2003; Mueller 2003). Since the 1980s, in the name of new public 
administration and reinventing government, many countries have attempted to constrain 
governmental growth even to reduce its size.  
      Since the 1980s, China has also made great efforts to control government expansion. In 
1982, Deng Xiaoping (1984: 374), the Chinese supreme leader, stressed that “streamlining 
organizations is a matter of great importance. In fact, it constitutes a revolution.” Since then, 
there have been six nationwide downsizing campaigns.  
 These downsizing movements achieved little success. In some cases, when central 
government positions were eliminated, officials made redundant by the eliminations were 
transferred to new positions in publicly funded service units, such as schools. Thus, in terms 
of decreasing the number of public employees, downsizing movements fell short of reaching 
their goal. Yang (2004: 53) also points out that, in terms of reducing government payroll 
spending, “the reforms have yielded few dividends so far.” 
      Aggregate data also document an increase in government size. The heaviest cut in public 
employment was implemented in 1998. Official accounts indicate a decrease of 1.15 million 
government administrative positions from 1998 to 2002. The number of public officials was 
reduced by 20% for central- and provincial-level party organizations, 47.5% for the State 
Council, 48.2% for provincial governments and prefectures, and 19.4% for counties and 
townships (Burns 2003). Nevertheless, the number of budgeted employees (civil servants plus 
employees, such as teachers, in public service units) actually kept increasing.
1
 As illustrated 
                                                     
1
 Local Fiscal Statistical Materials (difang caizheng tongjiziliao) compiled by the Budget Bureau or Treasury 
Bureau of the Ministry of Finance provide detailed information on the numbers of  budgeted employees at the 
subnational level. 
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in Figure 1, the ratio of local public employees to the total population expanded substantially 
during the period of 1998–2006.  
[Insert Fig.1 here] 
      Government size, measured by government expenditure as a share of GDP, has also 
shown an upward trend in recent years.  It was 12.79% of GDP in 1998, 17.24% in 2001 and 
18.52% in 2005 (see Figure 2). By 2007, government spending was close to 20% of GDP.  
[Insert Fig.2 here] 
       The main reasons for the expansion of China‟s government, as suggested in the literature, 
include “maintaining political patronage” (Burns 2003), “party control” (Brødsgaard 2002), 
the “authoritarian nature of China‟s political system” (Ngok and Zhu 2007) and 
“unsuccessful government function shifts” (Ni and An 2008). While this literature may have 
identified some causes of government growth in China, emphasizing solely the unique 
characteristics of the Chinese political system may overlook some important factors that also 
play roles in determining government size.  Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, 
empirical studies on government size using Chinese data are still rare.  
 This paper attempts to fill the gap in literature by providing a careful empirical 
investigation of the determinants of government size in China. While controlling for the 
special characteristics of China and examining the factors that are commonly mentioned in 
literature (for instance, Wagner‟s law), we believe that the test results should not only be 
relevant to those who are interested in China‟s case but also relevant for improving our 
understanding of government growth.  
 Our study provides some potentially intriguing findings that are rarely documented in 
literature. The results show that openness to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) may 
curtail government expansion. In addition, large population size tends to drive down 
4 
 
government size, suggesting that scale economies at the provincial level apply in China‟s 
case. 
      By employing a longitudinal dataset at China‟s provincial level from 1998 to 2006, our 
study investigates the determinants of local government size by utilizing both cross-sectional 
variations and volatility over time. The cross-sectional variations in the data make it possible 
to examine the role of local heterogeneity (such as, for instance, economy growth, minority 
population density and local public budget deficits) in the process of local government 
expansion. The volatility over time helps us to handle the endogeneity issue, which will be 
explained in detail in a later section.      
      The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief summary of the 
literature on the determinants of government size in China. Section 3 discusses the data, 
definition of variables, model specifications and econometric issues. Empirical results 
obtained are reported in Section 4. Section 5 presents discussion based on our empirical 
findings. The final section offers conclusions and policy implications.  
 
2 Variables explaining government size and theoretical arguments 
Based on the existing literature, this section summarizes factors that play roles in determining 
government size generally, while also outlining factors that may be unique in China‟s case. 
These factors include (1) economic development, (2) economies of scale, (3) openness to 
trade and FDI, (4) fiscal decentralization, (5) minority population density and (6) demand for 
public services. 
      Economic development. Wagner (1893) introduced the idea that there is a positive 
relationship between economic development and expansion of the public sector. Economic 
development leads to a simultaneous increase in government size since people will demand 
more and better public services when society becomes more affluent (Tobin 2005; Zhu and  
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Krug 2005). Empirical evidence for this argument is mixed. Akitoby et al. (2006) argue that, 
though there is strong evidence from industrialized countries, Wagner‟s law does not hold 
true in developing countries like China. Recent studies also cast doubt on the existence of 
Wagner‟s law (Halicioglu 2003; Lin and Song, 2002; Iyare and Lorde, 2004; Ram 1987; 
Sinha 2007; Zhang 2007, 2008a, b; Ziramba 2008). The existing studies usually fail to 
address the endogeneity issue when they test the validity of Wagner‟s law. The causal 
relationship between government size and economic development may be opposite of that 
proposed by Wagner‟s law; large government size may lead to local economic growth. 
Research that fails to handle this issue will provide misleading results. In our study, we deal 
with this reverse causality problem and provide new evidence from China. 
      Scale effects. Scale effects (total population divided by the number of counties in a 
province) may apply to government expansion. Since large fixed costs are incurred in setting 
up an administrative system, a locality with a small population may experience higher public 
consumption on a per capita basis. Multinational evidence shows that public expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP tends to be greater in smaller countries (Alesina and Wacziarg 1998), 
while some empirical studies of individual countries reveal a different pattern and show that 
scale effects help in explaining government growth (Andrews and Boyne 2009). Since the 
major component of China‟s public service (such as basic education and health) is relatively 
homogeneous, we propose a negative relationship between local population density and 
government size.    
      Openness to trade and FDI. The relationship between openness and government size is an 
intriguing issue for China which, since adoption of the „open door policy,‟ is greatly involved 
in multilateral trade and FDI. It is assumed that a country with greater exposure to 
international trade is more vulnerable to international economic shocks. Public consumption 
provides protection to the domestic economy when outside economic shocks occur. 
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Consequently, government spending serves to reduce risk in an open economy, and openness 
to trade is positively related to government size (Kimakova 2009; Rodrik 1998). Ferris, Park 
and Winer (2008), however, document that openness to trade contributes to reducing 
government size in Canada. Empirical studies examining the relationship between FDI and 
government size are rare.  
 In this paper, we propose that both openness to trade and FDI may push the government 
to perform better and strengthen civil service governance.  As long as economic development 
continues to be the utmost concern in China, local government has a strong incentive to 
promote a lean and clean mode of operation to attract foreign investors. Openness to trade 
and FDI also may enhance the learning capacities of local government. The demand for 
efficient public service from foreign firms may push local government to improve its 
allocative efficiency. Malesky (2004) documents that FDI improves governance in Vietnam 
at the provincial level. Cole et al. (2009) also show that foreign investors are more likely to 
place their investment in Chinese provinces with good governance. Consequently, we 
propose that openness to trade and FDI inflows reduces bureaucratic expansion.  
      Fiscal decentralization.  Discussing the Leviathan hypothesis, Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980: 185) point out that “total government intrusion into economy should be smaller, 
ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized.”  
Nevertheless, empirical studies on the Leviathan hypothesis present a mixed picture (Marlow 
1988; Oates 1985). Since it is not clear whether the impact of decentralization on government 
size varies when the forms of decentralization differ, Brennan and Buchanan‟s (1980) 
collusion hypothesis was put forward as an alternative to the Leviathan hypothesis. The 
collusion hypothesis proposes that, if the central government collects all taxes and then 
redistributes some of that revenue to local governments, the effect of decentralization in 
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reducing government expansion may be reduced.
2
 Brennan and Buchanan (1980: 183) note 
that “revenue sharing is undesirable, because it subverts the primary purpose of federalism, 
which is to create competition between jurisdictions.” Empirical evidence indicates that the 
collusion hypothesis holds true in many countries (Chen 2004; Ehdaie 1994; Grossman 1989; 
Stein 1998; Zhu and Krug 2005).  
 We have a similar hypothesis; fiscal decentralization may reduce government expansion 
at the local or provincial level when higher authorities do not grant local governments 
substantial fiscal transfers. Otherwise, even though expenditure decentralization is present, 
central fiscal subsidies may invite fiscal profligacy and bureaucratic expansion at the local or 
provincial level. 
      Minority density.  We hypothesize that minority density―the proportion of minority 
populations in the total population of a province―tends to increase public expenditure in 
GDP since civil unrest in ethnic minority areas is depicted as one of the major threats to 
China‟s social stability (Wang 2002). Localities with more ethnic minorities receive more 
central grants to moderate potential social instability (Wang 2002), and may spend more for 
public security. 
      Demand for public services. The relative size of the non-working population (compared 
to the working population) may increase the level of public expenditure. Martin (1982) finds 
a positive correlation between public expenditures and the population shares of students and 
the elderly. Students demand education services while the elderly require more health care. 
Thus, we hypothesize that governments will be larger in places when non-workers comprise 
greater percentages of the population. The unemployed may request that local government 
                                                     
2
 Lalvani (2002: 27–28) notes that the collusion hypothesis has two implications that merit further investigation.  
They are “(1) total government size will, ceteris paribus, increase with the level of collusion, and (2) the size of 
each level of government will, ceteris paribus, increase as collusion increases because no component of 
government will remain a member of the cartel if it does not benefit from it.” Zhu and Krug (2005: 8) argue that 
“The more the intergovernmental grants, the larger the total government size is.” 
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spend more on unemployment compensation and job training. Cusack, Notermans and Rein 
(1989) and Esping-Andersen (1996) provide evidence supporting the positive relationship 
between the unemployment rate and government size. In this study, we hypothesize that 
higher unemployment will be associated with larger government expenditures.
3
 
 
3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Definition of variables4 
3.1.1  Dependent variable 
This paper employs a provincial level panel dataset to investigate the determinants of 
government size in China. The dependent variable, government size (GSIZE), is measured by 
the ratio of local budgetary expenditure to the GDP of each province. This measurement has 
been commonly employed in multinational studies on government size (Alesina and 
Wacziarg 1998; Jin and Zou 2002; Ram 2009; Rodrik 1998).  Chen (2004) and Zhu and Krug 
(2005) also use the same measurement to examine government size in China. Government 
expenditure reflects the public sector‟s involvement in society; its share of total GDP serves 
as a proxy representing the scale of governmental activities relative to those of the private 
sector.  (For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Congleton 2001; De Witte and Moesen 
2010). This measure is not immune to criticism (Hood 1995). Nevertheless, because the 
Chinese government tends to under-report public sector employment, and since data for other 
proxies are not available, the share of local budgetary expenditure in GDP is employed by 
this study.  
 
                                                     
3
 China has wrestled with a social “safety net” for the elderly and the unemployed under the schemes of pension 
and unemployment insurance, respectively, despite the fact that the “safety net” is still fragmented and urban-
biased. 
4
 Appendix 1 provides a summary of the definition of all variables. Appendix 2 presents descriptive statistics for 
all variables listed in this section. 
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3.1.2  Independent variables 
1)  Economic development (RGDP_PC) is measured by provincial real GDP per capita. 
This variable is adopted for testing the validity of Wagner‟s law in China.  
2) Scale effects are measured by total population divided by the number of counties in a 
province (CP). 
3) Openness is measured by two proxies. Openness to trade (IMPEXP_PC) is calculated 
as the total amount of trade (imports plus exports) per capita in a province. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI_STOCK) is measured as the accumulated FDI stock per capita. 
4) Fiscal decentralization is measured by three indicators: expenditure decentralization 
(SONE), revenue decentralization (SONR), and vertical imbalance (VER_IMB). Following 
Marlow (1988) and Jin and Zou (2002), we employ the ratio of provincial budgetary 
expenditure to total budgetary expenditure as the measure of expenditure decentralization. 
The ratio of local revenue to total government revenue evaluates the degree of revenue 
decentralization as proposed by Jin and Zou (2002). In literature, there are several ways of 
defining vertical imbalance. Jin and Zou (2002) employ the share of central transfers in 
subnational expenditure, and Rodden (2002) proposes the share of central transfers in total 
subnational revenue as a proxy for vertical imbalance. In this paper, we adopt the method 
suggested by Jin and Zou (2002); thus, vertical imbalance is measured by the ratio of central 
transfers to subnational expenditure.  
5)  Minority density (MC_PERC) is measured by the share of autonomous counties (with 
mainly ethnic minority population) in the total number of counties in a province. 
Observations on the populations of ethnic minorities are available in the China Statistical 
Yearbook only after 2005; thus, we use the share of autonomous counties as a proxy for 
ethnic minority density. 
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      The demand for public service is measured by the gross dependency ratio (GDR), the 
ratio of non-working population to working population aged 15 to 64 and the unemployment 
rate. The information about unemployment rate reported in China Statistical Yearbooks is for 
urban areas only. This variable, denoted as UNEP_URBAN, serves as our proxy for provincial 
unemployment rates.  
 
3.2 Data, model specifications and econometric issues 
3.2.1  Data source 
This empirical study employs a provincial-level panel dataset from mainland China, which 
covers 30 provinces, for the period 1998–2006. Data before 1998 are not available. We also 
exclude Tibet since most data for that province are not reported. Data are collected from 
various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook and the Finance Yearbook of China.  FDI 
stock rather than FDI flow is employed as proxy for openness to trade; the former is a more 
reliable variable in that it measures the long-term commitments of foreign firms to China.  In 
view of problems such as „hot money‟ and „capital flight‟, FDI flow may not serve as a good 
proxy for our purpose.  
 
3.2.2  Model specifications and econometric issues 
In line with former studies, our work uses the standard static panel data model. Estimation 
results obtained using fixed-effects and random-effects models are compared with findings 
documented in the existing literature. The econometric literature argues that, when the 
endogeneity assumption holds, adopting the static panel random-effects model will yield 
consistent and efficient results. The static panel fixed-effects model, in a broader sense, will 
always provide consistent results; nevertheless, the panel fixed-effects estimator tends to be 
less efficient in finite samples and has problems with incidental parameters. The Hausman 
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test commonly is employed in the existing studies to examine whether there exists any 
correlation between the individual effects and the regressors. If these two terms are not 
correlated, the random-effects estimator is preferred; otherwise, the fixed-effects estimator 
should be employed. 
      When the Hausman test results suggest a correlation between individual specific effects 
and the regressors, we should also address the endogeneity problem. Many of the variables  
in our model, such as economic development and measures of openness, are all potentially 
endogenous, which may create reverse causal effects on government size. Since we are 
interested in the one-way causal effect of these factors on government size, we address the 
endogeneity issue in our study. We adopt the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
approach to handle the reverse causality problem (Hsiao 2002). More specifically, we use lag 
one to lag three regressors as instruments in the regression. To verify the validity of these 
moment conditions, we report Hansen J statistics in the empirical results.  
       The static two-factor panel data model adopted in our empirical study is stated as follows 
it it iti ty x u      , 
1,  ... , ;  1,  ... , ,i N t T   
where λi and ηt denote individual-specific and time-specific effects, respectively.  
      When the GMM estimator is employed, following Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu (2008), we 
first eliminate individual-specific effects by taking the first differences of the regression 
function and then subtract the first difference of the mean of each series in the model across 
individuals to eliminate the time-specific effects. More specifically, for the dependent 
variable, we compute: 
it t
y y  , 
where 
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

       
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The same transformation is applied to all explanatory variables. The GMM approach will 
then start with the final transformed model stated below: 
( ) ( )
it t it t it
y y x x u      , 
1,  ... , ;  1,  ... , .i N t T   
      We calculate the partial correlation coefficients between all repressors, which indicate 
that expenditure decentralization (SONE), revenue decentralization (SONR) and vertical 
imbalance (VER_IMB) are highly correlated. Proxies for openness to trade (IMPEXP_PC) 
and FDI stocks (FDI_STOCK) are also highly correlated. To control for multicolinearity 
problems, we enter each variable separately in the regression. 
 
4 Empirical results 
[Table 1 to Table 3 about here] 
The Hausman test statistics presented in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the individual specific 
effects are correlated with the regressors. Consequently, the fixed-effects model is preferred. 
When factors like FDI stocks (FDI_STOCK), expenditure decentralization (SONE) and 
revenue decentralization (SONR) are all excluded from the model, as is presented in the last 
column of Table 1, the Hausman test statistics suggest that we do not have an endogeneity 
problem. Thus, we can conclude that „reverse causality‟ may come from these three factors.  
     Table 3 presents empirical results obtained by using the two-step GMM estimator. We 
enter lags one to three of the regressors as instruments to deal with the endogeneity problem. 
Hansen test statistics indicate that the instruments we adopted are all valid. Notice that 
adopting the GMM approach can also produce efficiency gains, which can be observed by 
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comparing the corresponding standard errors of the same model specifications in different 
tables.  Most standard errors obtained by using the GMM approach are smaller than those 
produced by fixed-effects or random-effects estimators. Consequently, we adopt the 
empirical results of GMM estimates for reference. 
     Our empirical results yield the following findings:  (1) Wagner‟s law may not hold true in 
the case of China. The estimated coefficients for real GDP per capita are negative when they 
are significant. (2) The „economies of scale‟ hypothesis holds true in the case of China. There 
is a significant negative correlation between population per country and government size. (3) 
Both openness to trade and FDI have negative and significant effects on government size, 
suggesting that openness to trade and FDI may help to improve allocative efficiency for 
government services. (4) Both expenditure decentralization and revenue decentralization have 
significant positive effects on government size, while the estimated coefficients for vertical 
imbalance are not significant. (5) There is no evidence supporting the conjecture that 
minority population density, the gross dependency ratio or the unemployment rate has 
positive effects on government size.    
 
5 Discussion  
Some scholars attribute expansions in the size of government in China, notwithstanding 
occasional downsizing initiatives, to significant events or periods in its unique history, for 
example, the adoption of a Leninist party-state and a planned economy in the late 1940s 
(Burns 2001: 420). It is true that the size of China's government has been influenced by the 
nation‟s unique characteristics. Nevertheless, if we over-emphasize these factors unique to 
China, they may narrow our view with respect to identifying the problems of bureaucratic 
expansion in the country. The strategy adopted by this study is to provide a rigorous 
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empirical study on government size in China and to decipher the implications of the Chinese 
experience for other countries, especially developing countries.  
      Consistent with some studies of developing countries, the regression results reveal that 
Wagner‟s law does not hold true in China. The Research Institution for Fiscal Science of the 
Ministry of Finance (2002) reports that the poorer the locality, the faster the government 
grows and the larger the number of budgeted employees. Similar findings are also obtained 
by Ji et al. (2004). The inapplicability of Wagner's law to China roughly reflects the fact that 
poor localities may tend to spend more public money to prop up local employment and 
economic growth. As noted by Akitoby et al. (2006), Wagner‟s law receives less support in 
developing countries. Martinez-Vazquez and Yao (2009) argue that Wagner‟s law has more 
explanatory power in multi-country- than in single-country analyses since, in some countries, 
distinct from the private sector, the public sector is subject to political pressures, such as rent-
seeking (wherein individuals bribe public officials to obtain posts in the public sector). Some 
research further shows that bureaucratic expansion serves to promote rent-creation (bribery) 
and political patronage (Gelb, Knight and Sabot 1991). The implications of our finding that 
poorer localities tend to have larger governments may be more nuanced. Rent-seeking and 
nepotism are more prevalent in poor localities in China. Based on field research, Liu and Tao 
(2007) report that governments in poor localities in China tend to improve public services 
less than those in coastal areas.    
      Our results do not lend support to the Leviathan hypothesis. In our understanding, the 
effect of fiscal decentralization in curbing government expansion relies on some strict 
conditions, such as revenue autonomy granted to local authorities and limited central 
transfers or subsidies. Fiscal decentralization in developing countries may not fit squarely 
within these conditions. The Chinese situation neatly fits the collusion hypothesis because the 
central government has increased transfers to local governments markedly. Thus, expenditure 
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decentralization does not lead to hard budget constraints and tighter fiscal discipline in local 
China. In addition, we fail to find evidence to support the positive relationship between 
government size and minority factors, the gross dependency ratio, and the unemployment rate.  
      The most interesting findings in this study are that population per county and openness to 
trade and FDI reduce government size. To interpret scale effects, we would like to draw 
attention to dependent variables again. For many countries, personnel costs comprise the 
single largest item in governmental budgets. In China, this is more pronounced as personnel 
costs account for more than half of local government expenditures (Burns 2007; Fock and 
Wong 2008). Civil servants and teachers consume the majority of those costs. Scale effects 
suggest that the average cost of public services provided by civil servants and teachers is 
much cheaper in localities with  larger populations per county. Notice that the implication of 
scale effects should not be exaggerated. When two or more county units are merged, the cost 
of public services and goods may decline. It may also compromise the quality of public 
services.  
     Our empirical results document that openness to trade may serve as a device to promote a 
lean local government. Government efficiency improves when the capacity of institutional 
learning and adaptation has been enhanced. Especially when economic development is a 
primary concern of local leaders in developing countries, openness and FDI presence may 
become an engine both for GDP growth and governance enhancement. Cole et al. (2009) 
argue that provinces with better governance tend to attract more FDI inflows. Consequently, 
local officials have strong incentives to promote trade and FDI since they can reap great 
political capital from both improved administrative performance and GDP growth.   
 
6 Conclusion 
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This paper reviews the literature regarding government size and provides an empirical study 
using data from China. Our research contributes to the literature by offering a careful 
empirical study for the case of a transition economy.  In addition, the policy implications 
drawn from our findings are applicable not only to transition economies like China, but are 
applicable to other developing countries. 
      The results of our study document the following findings. (1) Wagner‟s law does not hold 
true in China. Poor localities have larger governments. (2) The „economies of scale‟ 
hypothesis holds true for China. (3) Openness to trade and FDI facilitate government 
downsizing and improve allocative efficiency in public services. (4) Fiscal decentralization in 
China does not curb bureaucratic expansion. Rather, the revenue sharing system increases 
local government size. (5) Factors such as minority population shares, the gross dependency 
ratio and the unemployment rate do not have significant effects on government size.  
    Our empirical findings for China‟s case may have some implications for other developing 
countries. Expanding administrative areas in a reasonable way may be helpful for reducing 
local government size since, when scale effects hold, the increase in population per county 
may reduce the per capita cost of public service provision. Openness to trade and FDI can 
serve as a governance-enhancing device.  This finding echoes some qualitative studies in 
other developing countries. Nevertheless, a worrisome issue in these countries is that further 
opening up to the global market may provoke resistance from entrenched insiders. The goal 
of governance-enhancing may not be realized when the country suffers from political 
setbacks on the road to trade openness.   
     In addition, public consumption and employment may promote local economic growth but, 
at the same time, they may be exploited as free goods for enhancing public officials‟ personal 
interests. Bureaucratic expansion as a result of nepotism has been embedded in the Chinese 
political and economic environment for a long time (Zhong 2003). Tensions exist between 
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advancing the welfare of the total population based on job creation in the public sector and 
maximizing personal interests through rent creation and poor governance. Thus, further 
research may need to go beyond the standard determinants of government size to explore the 
contributions of bureaucrats and other public officials to the growth of the public sector.   
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
GSIZE Government Size: ratio of provincial budgetary expenditure to local GDP. 
RGDP_PC Economic Development: real GDP per capita 
SONE Share of National Expenditure 
SONR Share of National Revenue 
VER_IMB Vertical Imbalance 
CP 
Population per Country: total population divided by number of counties 
in a province 
MC_PERC 
Minority County in Percentage: the share of autonomous counties (mainly 
ethnic minority population) within a province 
GDR 
Gross Dependency Ratio: the percentage of population aged 0-14, 65 and 
above in the total population 
UNEP_URBAN Registered Unemployment Rate in Urban Areas 
IMPEXP_PC 
Openness: the ratio of total amount of trade (import plus export) per 
capita 
FDI_STOCK Accumulated FDI Stock per Capita 
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics for variables 
Variable  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Observations 
GSIZE overall 14.33537 5.45327 5.676461 34.85395 N = 270 
 between  5.071202 7.838151 29.25498 n = 30 
 within  2.187667 5.037839 20.70225 T = 9 
       
RGDP_PC overall 7786.157 5616.638 2306.62 32140.28 N = 270 
 between  5655.5 2507.439 28983.6 n = 30 
 within  716.3513 4483.865 12127.72 T = 9 
       
SONE overall 2.335185 1.351105 0.4 7.6 N = 270 
 between  1.354626 0.411111 6.888889 n = 30 
 within  0.212244 1.690741 3.124074 T = 9 
       
SONR overall 1.569259 1.337388 0.1 7.1 N = 270 
 between  1.340167 0.1 6.255556 n = 30 
 within  0.214413 0.691482 2.413704 T = 9 
       
VER_IMB overall 51.42556 15.35421 17.69 93 N = 270 
 between  14.3761 23.26778 82.92 n = 30 
 within  5.935145 28.53334 66.01111 T = 9 
       
CP overall 466600.3 181307.3 116976.7 955263.2 N = 270 
 between  182460.9 122635.7 860649.1 n = 30 
 within  23884.6 337951.2 574778.4 T = 9 
       
MC_PERC overall 24.18019 34.38601 0 100 N = 270 
 between  34.74189 0 97.45333 n = 30 
 within  3.360692 1.492409 30.66241 T = 9 
       
GDR overall 41.24856 8.407216 21.96 60.44 N = 270 
 between  5.801471 28.81111 49.73778 n = 30 
 within  6.166456 21.61078 54.59522 T = 9 
       
UNEP_URBAN overall 3.556296 0.834178 0.6 6.5 N = 270 
 between  0.644972 1.277778 4.888889 n = 30 
 within  0.540587 1.634074 5.167407 T = 9 
       
IMPEXP_PC overall 6638.489 14410.09 122.18 99935.02 N = 270 
 between  12557.9 209.1544 50156.86 n = 30 
 within  7391.882 -25792.8 56416.65 T = 9 
       
FDI_STOCK overall 419.6916 629.7546 3.034643 3494.112 N = 270 
 between  608.4694 13.4097 2363.085 n = 30 
 within  193.3045 -399.608 1550.718 T = 9 
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Table 1 Fixed-effect and random-effect models with trade factor 
Dependent Variable: Government Size                                                                Sample Period: 1998-2006 (30 provinces) 
 FE FE FE RE RE RE 
Economic Development -0.745*** 
(0.098) 
-0.402*** 
(0.116) 
-0.376*** 
(0.105) 
-0.585*** 
(0.086) 
-0.420*** 
(0.091) 
-0.454***  
(0.083) 
Scale Effects 0.046     
(0.147) 
-0.084    
(0.169) 
0.021        
(0.174) 
-0.249*  
(0.100) 
-0.113    
(0.096) 
-0.121             
(0.092) 
Minority Density 0.006***   
(0.002) 
0.008***   
(0.002) 
0.007***   
(0.002) 
0.007***   
(0.001) 
0.005***   
(0.001) 
0.006***   
(0.001) 
Gross Dependency Ratio 0.057     
(0.033) 
0.144***   
(0.037) 
0.147***   
(0.037) 
0.089*   
(0.036) 
0.123**   
(0.038) 
0.124**    
(0.038) 
Urban Unemployment Rate 0.204***   
(0.036) 
0.144***   
(0.042) 
0.140***   
(0.041) 
0.182***   
(0.038) 
0.141***   
(0.040) 
0.153***   
(0.040) 
Trade 0.183***  
(0.016) 
0.216***    
(0.019) 
0.211***   
(0.018) 
0.206***   
(0.017) 
0.209***   
(0.019) 
0.213***  
(0.018) 
Revenue Decentralization 0.669***   
(0.075) 
- - 
0.291***  
(0.059) 
- - 
Expenditure Decentralization 
- 
-0.007    
(0.049) 
- - 
-0.084*   
(0.040) 
- 
Vertical Imbalance 
- - 
0.095*   
(0.043) 
- - 
- 0.126**  
(0.043) 
Constant 6.153** 
(1.953) 
4.743*   
(2.271) 
2.818     
(2.401) 
8.541***  
(1.405) 
5.473***  
(1.402) 
5.320*** 
(1.342) 
Hausman Test  - - - 102.83*** 12.64* 7.87 
R-Squared 0.699*** 0.597*** 0.606*** - - - 
N 270 270 270 270 270 270 
1). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
2). Asymptotic standard errors, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses. 
3). All variables, except Minority Density, are in logarithms. 
 
 
 
Table 2 Fixed-effect and random-effect models with FDI factor 
Dependent Variable: Government Size                                                               Sample Period: 1998-2006 (30 provinces) 
 FE FE FE RE RE RE 
Economic Development -0.428*** 
(0.099) 
0.009     
(0.106) 
-0.026    
(0.100) 
-0.273**  
(0.085) 
-0.064    
(0.086) 
-0.120    
(0.084) 
Scale Effects 0.119     
(0.162) 
-0.030    
(0.182) 
0.098     
(0.188) 
-0.361***   
(0.110) 
-0.157    
(0.106) 
-0.203    
(0.108) 
Minority Density 0.006***   
(0.002) 
0.007***    
(0.002) 
0.006**  
(0.002) 
0.009***   
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.008***    
(0.001) 
Gross Dependency Ratio 0.008     
(0.036) 
0.091*     
(0.039) 
0.094*      
(0.039) 
0.025     
(0.041) 
0.061     
(0.043) 
0.061     
(0.042) 
Urban Unemployment Rate 0.250***   
(0.040) 
0.165***   
(0.046) 
0.179***   
(0.044) 
0.282***   
(0.041) 
0.236***    
(0.044) 
0.265***   
(0.043) 
FDI 0.188***   
(0.024) 
0.233***   
(0.026) 
0.232***   
(0.026) 
0.187*** 
(0.025) 
0.171***   
(0.026) 
0.182*** 
(0.026) 
Revenue Decentralization 0.685***    
(0.084) 
- - 
0.278***   
(0.063) 
- - 
Expenditure Decentralization 
- 
-0.087    
(0.051) 
- - 
-0.153*** 
(0.043) 
- 
Vertical Imbalance 
- - 
0.102*   
(0.047) 
- - 
0.132**   
(0.049) 
Constant 2.949     
(2.105) 
1.064     
(2.366) 
-0.699    
(2.532) 
7.929***   
(1.566) 
3.692*    
(1.554) 
4.136**   
(1.586) 
Hausman Test  - - - 81.71*** 281.67* 163.75*** 
R-squared 0.699*** 0.597*** 0.606*** - - - 
N 270 270 270 270 270 270 
1). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
2). Asymptotic standard errors, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses. 
3). All variables, except Minority Density, are in logarithm. 
25 
 
Table 3 GMM model 
Dependent Variable: Government Size                                                               Sample Period: 1998-2006 (30 provinces) 
 GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Economic Development -0.181**  
(0.054) 
-0.001    
(0.088) 
0.064     
(0.086) 
-0.203***   
(0.057) 
-0.063    
(0.085) 
0.050      
(0.083) 
Scale Effects -0.252***   
(0.074) 
-0.412**   
(0.134) 
-0.356**   
(0.133) 
-0.237**   
(0.077) 
-0.534***    
(0.140) 
-0.442**    
(0.135) 
Minority Density -0.005    
(0.004) 
0.026     
(0.074) 
0.031     
(0.067) 
0.000     
(0.004) 
0.019     
(0.077) 
0.035     
(0.068) 
Gross Dependency Ratio 0.097**    
(0.030) 
0.003     
(0.046) 
-0.009    
(0.047) 
0.093**     
(0.030) 
0.010     
(0.039) 
0.008     
(0.042) 
Urban Unemployment Rate 0.106**    
(0.032) 
0.025     
(0.044) 
0.030     
(0.042) 
0.092*     
(0.036) 
0.025     
(0.039) 
0.053     
(0.041) 
Trade -0.060**    
(0.018) 
-0.064*     
(0.027) 
-0.043      
(0.025) 
- - - 
Revenue Decentralization 0.746***    
(0.043) 
- - 
0.752***   
(0.042) 
- - 
Expenditure Decentralization 
- 
0.212***    
(0.033) 
- - 
0.231***    
(0.033) 
- 
Vertical Imbalance 
- - 
-0.042    
(0.043) 
- - 
-0.071    
(0.042) 
FDI 
- - - 
-0.100**    
(0.035) 
-0.141***     
(0.040) 
-0.076*   
(0.037) 
Hansen Statistic 23.340 28.894 30.763 19.353 28.937 29.123 
P-Value 0.716 0.418 0.328 0.887 0.416 0.406 
Number of IVs 28 28 28 28 28 28 
N 120 120 120 120 120 120 
1). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
2). The GMM estimates reported are all two-step results. 
3). Asymptotic standard errors, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses. 
4). All variables, except Minority Density, are in logarithm. 
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Fig. 1 Public employee as percentage of total population in China (1998-2006, unit: %) 
Data source: Local Fiscal Statistical Materials, 1999–2009. 
Note: (1) Employee1 refers to public sector employees (may not be publicly funded) in local governments while employee2 refers 
to budgeted employees paid by local governments.  (2) The data is collected from Local Fiscal Statistical Materials and is normally 
lag two years behind the publishing year after 2003. For example, the data for 2005 were released in 2007. 
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Fig. 2 Government spending as percentage of GDP in China 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2008. 
